| 1 | //! Per-repository secrets, sealed to the owner's ssh-ed25519 keys. |
| 2 | //! |
| 3 | //! anvil stores only sealed envelopes: the plaintext is encrypted by the |
| 4 | //! *client* (the browser's WebCrypto, or the CLI) to every ssh-ed25519 key the |
| 5 | //! repository owner has registered, so nothing on disk — database, backup, |
| 6 | //! snapshot — can be opened by the server on its own. See `docs/secrets.md` |
| 7 | //! for the threat model and the CI unlock flow. |
| 8 | //! |
| 9 | //! # Envelope format (`anvil-secret-v1`) |
| 10 | //! |
| 11 | //! One random 256-bit *file key* per secret encrypts the value; that file key |
| 12 | //! is then wrapped once per recipient key: |
| 13 | //! |
| 14 | //! ```text |
| 15 | //! file_key = 32 random bytes |
| 16 | //! body = AES-256-GCM(file_key, nonce, value, aad = body_aad()) |
| 17 | //! per recipient r: |
| 18 | //! epk, esk = fresh X25519 keypair |
| 19 | //! shared = X25519(esk, r.x25519) |
| 20 | //! wrap_key = HKDF-SHA256(ikm = shared, salt = epk ‖ r.x25519, info = INFO) |
| 21 | //! wrap = nonce ‖ AES-256-GCM(wrap_key, nonce, file_key, aad = r.fingerprint) |
| 22 | //! ``` |
| 23 | //! |
| 24 | //! The recipient's X25519 public key is the birational map of their Ed25519 |
| 25 | //! one; the matching secret is `clamp(SHA-512(seed)[..32])`, exactly as age |
| 26 | //! derives them for `ssh-ed25519` recipients. |
| 27 | //! |
| 28 | //! AES-GCM and HKDF-SHA256 (rather than age's ChaCha20-Poly1305) because the |
| 29 | //! browser is a first-class encryptor here and WebCrypto ships neither ChaCha |
| 30 | //! nor a stream AEAD — every primitive above is native in `crypto.subtle`. |
| 31 | |
| 32 | use aes_gcm::{ |
| 33 | Aes256Gcm, |
| 34 | KeyInit, |
| 35 | aead::{ |
| 36 | Aead, |
| 37 | Payload, |
| 38 | }, |
| 39 | }; |
| 40 | use base64::Engine; |
| 41 | use serde::{ |
| 42 | Deserialize, |
| 43 | Serialize, |
| 44 | }; |
| 45 | use sha2::{ |
| 46 | Digest, |
| 47 | Sha512, |
| 48 | }; |
| 49 | |
| 50 | use crate::{ |
| 51 | error::{ |
| 52 | Error, |
| 53 | Result, |
| 54 | }, |
| 55 | models::{ |
| 56 | RepoSecret, |
| 57 | UserSecret, |
| 58 | }, |
| 59 | }; |
| 60 | |
| 61 | /// Algorithm identifier carried in every envelope. |
| 62 | pub const ALG: &str = "x25519-hkdf-sha256+aes256gcm"; |
| 63 | |
| 64 | /// HKDF `info` string binding derived wrap keys to this scheme. |
| 65 | const WRAP_INFO: &[u8] = b"anvil-secret-v1 wrap"; |
| 66 | |
| 67 | /// Cap on a secret's plaintext. Environment variables, not blobs. |
| 68 | pub const MAX_VALUE_BYTES: usize = 64 * 1024; |
| 69 | |
| 70 | /// Cap on a stored envelope: the value plus per-recipient overhead, base64'd, |
| 71 | /// with room for a generous number of keys. |
| 72 | pub const MAX_ENVELOPE_BYTES: usize = 256 * 1024; |
| 73 | |
| 74 | fn b64() -> base64::engine::general_purpose::GeneralPurpose { |
| 75 | base64::engine::general_purpose::STANDARD |
| 76 | } |
| 77 | |
| 78 | fn decode_b64(what: &str, s: &str) -> Result<Vec<u8>> { |
| 79 | b64() |
| 80 | .decode(s) |
| 81 | .map_err(|e| Error::Invalid(format!("secret envelope: bad base64 in {what}: {e}"))) |
| 82 | } |
| 83 | |
| 84 | fn decode_array<const N: usize>(what: &str, s: &str) -> Result<[u8; N]> { |
| 85 | let bytes = decode_b64(what, s)?; |
| 86 | <[u8; N]>::try_from(bytes.as_slice()) |
| 87 | .map_err(|_| Error::Invalid(format!("secret envelope: {what} must be {N} bytes"))) |
| 88 | } |
| 89 | |
| 90 | /// A sealed secret value: the encrypted body plus one wrapped file key per |
| 91 | /// recipient. Serialized as JSON, which is what both the browser and the CLI |
| 92 | /// hand to the server. |
| 93 | #[derive(Clone, Debug, Deserialize, Serialize)] |
| 94 | pub struct Envelope { |
| 95 | pub v: u32, |
| 96 | pub alg: String, |
| 97 | pub recipients: Vec<Stanza>, |
| 98 | /// Base64 12-byte AES-GCM nonce for the body. |
| 99 | pub nonce: String, |
| 100 | /// Base64 AES-GCM ciphertext ‖ tag of the value. |
| 101 | pub ct: String, |
| 102 | } |
| 103 | |
| 104 | /// One recipient's wrapped copy of the file key. |
| 105 | #[derive(Clone, Debug, Deserialize, Serialize)] |
| 106 | pub struct Stanza { |
| 107 | /// The recipient key's canonical SSH fingerprint (`SHA256:…`). |
| 108 | pub fp: String, |
| 109 | /// Base64 32-byte ephemeral X25519 public key. |
| 110 | pub epk: String, |
| 111 | /// Base64 12-byte nonce ‖ AES-GCM ciphertext of the 32-byte file key. |
| 112 | pub wrap: String, |
| 113 | } |
| 114 | |
| 115 | impl Envelope { |
| 116 | /// Parse and structurally validate an envelope received from a client. |
| 117 | pub fn parse(json: &str) -> Result<Self> { |
| 118 | if json.len() > MAX_ENVELOPE_BYTES { |
| 119 | return Err(Error::Invalid("secret envelope too large".into())); |
| 120 | } |
| 121 | let env: Envelope = serde_json::from_str(json) |
| 122 | .map_err(|e| Error::Invalid(format!("secret envelope: {e}")))?; |
| 123 | env.validate()?; |
| 124 | Ok(env) |
| 125 | } |
| 126 | |
| 127 | /// Check the parts the *server* can check: version, algorithm, and that |
| 128 | /// every field decodes to the right length. It cannot check the |
| 129 | /// ciphertext — that is the whole point. |
| 130 | pub fn validate(&self) -> Result<()> { |
| 131 | if self.v != 1 || self.alg != ALG { |
| 132 | return Err(Error::Invalid(format!( |
| 133 | "secret envelope: unsupported version/algorithm ({}/{})", |
| 134 | self.v, self.alg |
| 135 | ))); |
| 136 | } |
| 137 | if self.recipients.is_empty() { |
| 138 | return Err(Error::Invalid("secret envelope: no recipients".into())); |
| 139 | } |
| 140 | decode_array::<12>("nonce", &self.nonce)?; |
| 141 | if decode_b64("ct", &self.ct)?.len() < 16 { |
| 142 | return Err(Error::Invalid("secret envelope: body too short".into())); |
| 143 | } |
| 144 | for r in &self.recipients { |
| 145 | if !r.fp.starts_with("SHA256:") { |
| 146 | return Err(Error::Invalid( |
| 147 | "secret envelope: recipient fingerprint must be SHA256:…".into(), |
| 148 | )); |
| 149 | } |
| 150 | decode_array::<32>("epk", &r.epk)?; |
| 151 | if decode_b64("wrap", &r.wrap)?.len() != 12 + 32 + 16 { |
| 152 | return Err(Error::Invalid("secret envelope: bad wrapped key".into())); |
| 153 | } |
| 154 | } |
| 155 | Ok(()) |
| 156 | } |
| 157 | |
| 158 | /// The fingerprints this envelope can be opened by, in order. |
| 159 | pub fn recipient_fingerprints(&self) -> Vec<String> { |
| 160 | self.recipients.iter().map(|r| r.fp.clone()).collect() |
| 161 | } |
| 162 | |
| 163 | /// Decrypt with `identity`, which must be one of the recipients. |
| 164 | pub fn open(&self, aad: &[u8], identity: &Identity) -> Result<Vec<u8>> { |
| 165 | self.validate()?; |
| 166 | let stanza = self |
| 167 | .recipients |
| 168 | .iter() |
| 169 | .find(|r| r.fp == identity.fingerprint) |
| 170 | .ok_or_else(|| { |
| 171 | Error::Invalid(format!( |
| 172 | "secret is not sealed to {} — rekey it first", |
| 173 | identity.fingerprint |
| 174 | )) |
| 175 | })?; |
| 176 | |
| 177 | let epk = decode_array::<32>("epk", &stanza.epk)?; |
| 178 | let shared = x25519(&identity.secret, &epk); |
| 179 | if shared.iter().all(|b| *b == 0) { |
| 180 | return Err(Error::Invalid( |
| 181 | "secret envelope: degenerate key exchange".into(), |
| 182 | )); |
| 183 | } |
| 184 | let mut salt = [0u8; 64]; |
| 185 | salt[..32].copy_from_slice(&epk); |
| 186 | salt[32..].copy_from_slice(&identity.public); |
| 187 | let wrap_key = hkdf_sha256(&shared, &salt, WRAP_INFO); |
| 188 | |
| 189 | let wrap = decode_b64("wrap", &stanza.wrap)?; |
| 190 | let wrap_nonce = <[u8; 12]>::try_from(&wrap[..12]) |
| 191 | .map_err(|_| Error::Invalid("secret envelope: bad wrap nonce".into()))?; |
| 192 | let file_key = aes_open(&wrap_key, &wrap_nonce, &wrap[12..], stanza.fp.as_bytes()) |
| 193 | .map_err(|_| Error::Invalid("secret envelope: wrapped key did not open".into()))?; |
| 194 | let file_key = <[u8; 32]>::try_from(file_key.as_slice()) |
| 195 | .map_err(|_| Error::Invalid("secret envelope: bad file key".into()))?; |
| 196 | |
| 197 | let nonce = decode_array::<12>("nonce", &self.nonce)?; |
| 198 | let ct = decode_b64("ct", &self.ct)?; |
| 199 | aes_open(&file_key, &nonce, &ct, aad) |
| 200 | .map_err(|_| Error::Invalid("secret envelope: body did not open".into())) |
| 201 | } |
| 202 | } |
| 203 | |
| 204 | /// A key a secret can be sealed *to*: an ssh-ed25519 public key mapped onto |
| 205 | /// Curve25519. |
| 206 | #[derive(Clone, Debug)] |
| 207 | pub struct Recipient { |
| 208 | pub fingerprint: String, |
| 209 | pub x25519: [u8; 32], |
| 210 | } |
| 211 | |
| 212 | impl Recipient { |
| 213 | /// Build a recipient from a registered OpenSSH public-key line. Only |
| 214 | /// `ssh-ed25519` keys can receive secrets: RSA would need a second |
| 215 | /// scheme, and `*-sk` (FIDO) keys cannot do key agreement at all. |
| 216 | pub fn from_openssh(line: &str) -> Result<Self> { |
| 217 | let key = ssh_key::PublicKey::from_openssh(line.trim()) |
| 218 | .map_err(|e| Error::Invalid(format!("invalid ssh public key: {e}")))?; |
| 219 | let ed = key.key_data().ed25519().ok_or_else(|| { |
| 220 | Error::Invalid(format!( |
| 221 | "{} keys cannot receive secrets — register an ssh-ed25519 key", |
| 222 | key.algorithm().as_str() |
| 223 | )) |
| 224 | })?; |
| 225 | Ok(Self { |
| 226 | fingerprint: key.fingerprint(ssh_key::HashAlg::Sha256).to_string(), |
| 227 | x25519: ed25519_public_to_x25519(&ed.0)?, |
| 228 | }) |
| 229 | } |
| 230 | } |
| 231 | |
| 232 | /// The private half: what the CLI holds to open envelopes. |
| 233 | #[derive(Clone)] |
| 234 | pub struct Identity { |
| 235 | pub fingerprint: String, |
| 236 | secret: [u8; 32], |
| 237 | public: [u8; 32], |
| 238 | } |
| 239 | |
| 240 | impl std::fmt::Debug for Identity { |
| 241 | /// Never render the secret scalar. |
| 242 | fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result { |
| 243 | f.debug_struct("Identity") |
| 244 | .field("fingerprint", &self.fingerprint) |
| 245 | .finish_non_exhaustive() |
| 246 | } |
| 247 | } |
| 248 | |
| 249 | impl Identity { |
| 250 | /// Derive an identity from a decrypted OpenSSH private key. |
| 251 | pub fn from_private_key(key: &ssh_key::PrivateKey) -> Result<Self> { |
| 252 | let ed = key.key_data().ed25519().ok_or_else(|| { |
| 253 | Error::Invalid(format!( |
| 254 | "{} private keys cannot open secrets — use an ssh-ed25519 key", |
| 255 | key.algorithm().as_str() |
| 256 | )) |
| 257 | })?; |
| 258 | let secret = ed25519_seed_to_x25519(ed.private.as_ref()); |
| 259 | Ok(Self { |
| 260 | fingerprint: key |
| 261 | .public_key() |
| 262 | .fingerprint(ssh_key::HashAlg::Sha256) |
| 263 | .to_string(), |
| 264 | public: ed25519_public_to_x25519(&ed.public.0)?, |
| 265 | secret, |
| 266 | }) |
| 267 | } |
| 268 | } |
| 269 | |
| 270 | /// Seal `plaintext` to every recipient. Mirrors `sealSecret()` in the |
| 271 | /// browser's `secrets.js` byte for byte — the interop test in |
| 272 | /// `tests/js_interop.rs` opens what that code produces. |
| 273 | pub fn seal(plaintext: &[u8], aad: &[u8], recipients: &[Recipient]) -> Result<Envelope> { |
| 274 | if plaintext.len() > MAX_VALUE_BYTES { |
| 275 | return Err(Error::Invalid(format!( |
| 276 | "secret is larger than {MAX_VALUE_BYTES} bytes" |
| 277 | ))); |
| 278 | } |
| 279 | if recipients.is_empty() { |
| 280 | return Err(Error::Invalid( |
| 281 | "no ssh-ed25519 keys to seal to — register one first".into(), |
| 282 | )); |
| 283 | } |
| 284 | let file_key: [u8; 32] = random_bytes(); |
| 285 | let nonce: [u8; 12] = random_bytes(); |
| 286 | let ct = aes_seal(&file_key, &nonce, plaintext, aad)?; |
| 287 | |
| 288 | let mut stanzas = Vec::with_capacity(recipients.len()); |
| 289 | for r in recipients { |
| 290 | let esk: [u8; 32] = random_bytes(); |
| 291 | let epk = x25519(&esk, &X25519_BASEPOINT); |
| 292 | let shared = x25519(&esk, &r.x25519); |
| 293 | if shared.iter().all(|b| *b == 0) { |
| 294 | return Err(Error::Invalid(format!( |
| 295 | "recipient {} has a degenerate public key", |
| 296 | r.fingerprint |
| 297 | ))); |
| 298 | } |
| 299 | let mut salt = [0u8; 64]; |
| 300 | salt[..32].copy_from_slice(&epk); |
| 301 | salt[32..].copy_from_slice(&r.x25519); |
| 302 | let wrap_key = hkdf_sha256(&shared, &salt, WRAP_INFO); |
| 303 | let wrap_nonce: [u8; 12] = random_bytes(); |
| 304 | let mut wrap = wrap_nonce.to_vec(); |
| 305 | wrap.extend_from_slice(&aes_seal( |
| 306 | &wrap_key, |
| 307 | &wrap_nonce, |
| 308 | &file_key, |
| 309 | r.fingerprint.as_bytes(), |
| 310 | )?); |
| 311 | stanzas.push(Stanza { |
| 312 | fp: r.fingerprint.clone(), |
| 313 | epk: b64().encode(epk), |
| 314 | wrap: b64().encode(wrap), |
| 315 | }); |
| 316 | } |
| 317 | Ok(Envelope { |
| 318 | v: 1, |
| 319 | alg: ALG.to_string(), |
| 320 | recipients: stanzas, |
| 321 | nonce: b64().encode(nonce), |
| 322 | ct: b64().encode(ct), |
| 323 | }) |
| 324 | } |
| 325 | |
| 326 | /// Associated data bound into a sealed body: the scheme, the repository, and |
| 327 | /// the variable name. Re-pointing a stolen envelope at another repo or another |
| 328 | /// variable name therefore fails to open. |
| 329 | pub fn body_aad(owner: &str, repo: &str, name: &str) -> Vec<u8> { |
| 330 | format!("anvil-secret-v1\n{owner}/{repo}\n{name}").into_bytes() |
| 331 | } |
| 332 | |
| 333 | /// Associated data for a [`UserSecret`](UserSecret): the |
| 334 | /// scheme, the owning account, and the variable name. A user-secret envelope |
| 335 | /// and a repo-secret envelope never open under each other's AAD, even if a |
| 336 | /// name collides, because `user:{username}` can never equal `{owner}/{repo}`. |
| 337 | pub fn user_aad(username: &str, name: &str) -> Vec<u8> { |
| 338 | format!("anvil-secret-v1\nuser:{username}\n{name}").into_bytes() |
| 339 | } |
| 340 | |
| 341 | /// The three ways a [`UserSecret`](UserSecret) lands in a |
| 342 | /// session container. |
| 343 | pub mod kind { |
| 344 | /// Injected as an environment variable named after the secret. |
| 345 | pub const ENV: &str = "env"; |
| 346 | /// Written whole as a file at the secret's `path`, under `$HOME`. |
| 347 | pub const FILE: &str = "file"; |
| 348 | /// Merged into one field (`field`, a jq-style path) of the JSON file at |
| 349 | /// `path`, under `$HOME` — the rest of that file is left alone. |
| 350 | pub const JSON: &str = "json"; |
| 351 | } |
| 352 | |
| 353 | /// Whether `name` is usable as a shell environment variable: uppercase, |
| 354 | /// digits, and underscores, not starting with a digit. |
| 355 | pub fn valid_name(name: &str) -> bool { |
| 356 | !name.is_empty() |
| 357 | && name.len() <= 64 |
| 358 | && !name.starts_with(|c: char| c.is_ascii_digit()) |
| 359 | && name |
| 360 | .chars() |
| 361 | .all(|c| c.is_ascii_uppercase() || c.is_ascii_digit() || c == '_') |
| 362 | } |
| 363 | |
| 364 | // --- primitives ------------------------------------------------------------ |
| 365 | |
| 366 | fn random_bytes<const N: usize>() -> [u8; N] { |
| 367 | // `UnwrapErr(SysRng)` is the OS generator, panicking if it ever fails — |
| 368 | // what `OsRng.fill_bytes` did before rand 0.10 renamed and split the two. |
| 369 | use rand::{ |
| 370 | Rng, |
| 371 | rand_core::UnwrapErr, |
| 372 | rngs::SysRng, |
| 373 | }; |
| 374 | let mut bytes = [0u8; N]; |
| 375 | UnwrapErr(SysRng).fill_bytes(&mut bytes); |
| 376 | bytes |
| 377 | } |
| 378 | |
| 379 | /// HKDF-SHA256 (RFC 5869) for a single 32-byte output — extract, then one |
| 380 | /// expand block. Written out rather than pulled in as a dependency: two HMAC |
| 381 | /// calls are not worth one, and it was originally a `sha2`/`digest` |
| 382 | /// generation ahead of the rest of the tree. |
| 383 | fn hkdf_sha256(ikm: &[u8], salt: &[u8], info: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] { |
| 384 | use hmac::{ |
| 385 | Hmac, |
| 386 | KeyInit, |
| 387 | Mac, |
| 388 | }; |
| 389 | type H = Hmac<sha2::Sha256>; |
| 390 | |
| 391 | let mut extract = H::new_from_slice(salt).expect("HMAC accepts any key length"); |
| 392 | extract.update(ikm); |
| 393 | let prk = extract.finalize().into_bytes(); |
| 394 | |
| 395 | let mut expand = H::new_from_slice(&prk).expect("HMAC accepts any key length"); |
| 396 | expand.update(info); |
| 397 | expand.update(&[0x01]); |
| 398 | expand.finalize().into_bytes().into() |
| 399 | } |
| 400 | |
| 401 | fn aes_seal(key: &[u8; 32], nonce: &[u8; 12], msg: &[u8], aad: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>> { |
| 402 | let cipher = Aes256Gcm::new(key.into()); |
| 403 | cipher |
| 404 | .encrypt(nonce.into(), Payload { msg, aad }) |
| 405 | .map_err(|_| Error::Invalid("sealing secret failed".into())) |
| 406 | } |
| 407 | |
| 408 | fn aes_open( |
| 409 | key: &[u8; 32], |
| 410 | nonce: &[u8; 12], |
| 411 | ct: &[u8], |
| 412 | aad: &[u8], |
| 413 | ) -> std::result::Result<Vec<u8>, ()> { |
| 414 | let cipher = Aes256Gcm::new(key.into()); |
| 415 | cipher |
| 416 | .decrypt(nonce.into(), Payload { msg: ct, aad }) |
| 417 | .map_err(|_| ()) |
| 418 | } |
| 419 | |
| 420 | /// The Curve25519 base point in Montgomery form (u = 9). |
| 421 | const X25519_BASEPOINT: [u8; 32] = { |
| 422 | let mut u = [0u8; 32]; |
| 423 | u[0] = 9; |
| 424 | u |
| 425 | }; |
| 426 | |
| 427 | /// X25519 scalar multiplication: clamp the scalar, multiply the u-coordinate. |
| 428 | fn x25519(scalar: &[u8; 32], point: &[u8; 32]) -> [u8; 32] { |
| 429 | curve25519_dalek::montgomery::MontgomeryPoint(*point) |
| 430 | .mul_clamped(*scalar) |
| 431 | .to_bytes() |
| 432 | } |
| 433 | |
| 434 | /// Map an Ed25519 public key (compressed Edwards `y`) to its X25519 |
| 435 | /// (Montgomery `u`) counterpart. |
| 436 | fn ed25519_public_to_x25519(public: &[u8; 32]) -> Result<[u8; 32]> { |
| 437 | curve25519_dalek::edwards::CompressedEdwardsY(*public) |
| 438 | .decompress() |
| 439 | .map(|p| p.to_montgomery().to_bytes()) |
| 440 | .ok_or_else(|| Error::Invalid("ssh-ed25519 key is not a valid curve point".into())) |
| 441 | } |
| 442 | |
| 443 | /// Map an Ed25519 seed to the X25519 secret scalar: SHA-512, keep the low |
| 444 | /// half, clamp — the standard derivation OpenSSH keys share with age. |
| 445 | fn ed25519_seed_to_x25519(seed: &[u8]) -> [u8; 32] { |
| 446 | let digest = Sha512::digest(seed); |
| 447 | let mut scalar = [0u8; 32]; |
| 448 | scalar.copy_from_slice(&digest[..32]); |
| 449 | scalar[0] &= 248; |
| 450 | scalar[31] &= 127; |
| 451 | scalar[31] |= 64; |
| 452 | scalar |
| 453 | } |
| 454 | |
| 455 | // --- json merge (the "json" kind) ------------------------------------------- |
| 456 | |
| 457 | /// Every strict prefix of `field` that ends right before a top-level `.` |
| 458 | /// (i.e. one outside `[...]` and quoted strings), shortest first. For |
| 459 | /// `.oauthAccount.token` that's just `[".oauthAccount"]`; for `.a.b.c` it's |
| 460 | /// `[".a", ".a.b"]`. Used to vivify each missing intermediate object before |
| 461 | /// the final assignment — see the comment in [`json_merge`]. |
| 462 | fn path_prefixes(field: &str) -> Vec<&str> { |
| 463 | let mut prefixes = Vec::new(); |
| 464 | let mut depth = 0i32; |
| 465 | let mut in_quotes = false; |
| 466 | for (i, b) in field.bytes().enumerate() { |
| 467 | match b { |
| 468 | b'"' => in_quotes = !in_quotes, |
| 469 | b'[' if !in_quotes => depth += 1, |
| 470 | b']' if !in_quotes => depth -= 1, |
| 471 | b'.' if !in_quotes && depth == 0 && i > 0 => prefixes.push(&field[..i]), |
| 472 | _ => {} |
| 473 | } |
| 474 | } |
| 475 | prefixes |
| 476 | } |
| 477 | |
| 478 | /// Set `field` (a jq-style path, e.g. `.oauthAccount.token`) to `value` |
| 479 | /// within `current` (a JSON document, or empty for "start from `{}`"), |
| 480 | /// returning the whole document with that one field changed. |
| 481 | /// |
| 482 | /// `value` is bound as a jq variable (`$__anvil_secret_value`) rather than |
| 483 | /// interpolated into the filter text, so it is never parsed as jq syntax — |
| 484 | /// only `field` is; it comes from the secret's own metadata (set by whoever |
| 485 | /// created it), never from the decrypted plaintext. |
| 486 | pub fn json_merge(current: &[u8], field: &str, value: &str) -> Result<Vec<u8>> { |
| 487 | use jaq_core::{ |
| 488 | Compiler, |
| 489 | Ctx, |
| 490 | Vars, |
| 491 | data, |
| 492 | load::{ |
| 493 | Arena, |
| 494 | File, |
| 495 | Loader, |
| 496 | }, |
| 497 | unwrap_valr, |
| 498 | }; |
| 499 | use jaq_json::Val; |
| 500 | |
| 501 | let current = if current.is_empty() { |
| 502 | b"{}".as_slice() |
| 503 | } else { |
| 504 | current |
| 505 | }; |
| 506 | let current = jaq_json::read::parse_single(current) |
| 507 | .map_err(|e| Error::Invalid(format!("json secret: existing file is not JSON: {e}")))?; |
| 508 | |
| 509 | // Deliberately no jaq_std/jaq_json defs: `field = $value` is core jq |
| 510 | // path/assignment syntax, entirely handled by jaq_core, and never names a |
| 511 | // library filter. jaq_std's defs.jq is loaded as one unit — pulling it in |
| 512 | // for the few basics jaq_json's own defs lean on drags in every other |
| 513 | // definition too, including ones behind features (format/log/math/regex/ |
| 514 | // time) this crate does not enable, which then fail to resolve even |
| 515 | // though nothing here calls them. Which is why jaq-std is not a |
| 516 | // dependency of this crate — it is only in the tree because jaq-json |
| 517 | // requires it. |
| 518 | // |
| 519 | // Real jq auto-creates missing intermediate objects (`{} | .a.b = 1` |
| 520 | // gives `{"a":{"b":1}}`); jaq 3.1.1 does not — `setpath`/`=` error with |
| 521 | // "cannot use null as iterable" the moment a path walks through a |
| 522 | // missing key, confirmed against both jaq-core directly and the real |
| 523 | // `jaq` CLI binary. `//=` (default-if-null) does not have that bug, so |
| 524 | // each intermediate prefix of the path is vivified with one before the |
| 525 | // final assignment. |
| 526 | let mut program = String::new(); |
| 527 | for prefix in path_prefixes(field) { |
| 528 | program.push('('); |
| 529 | program.push_str(prefix); |
| 530 | program.push_str(" //= {}) | "); |
| 531 | } |
| 532 | program.push_str(field); |
| 533 | program.push_str(" = $__anvil_secret_value"); |
| 534 | let arena = Arena::default(); |
| 535 | let modules = Loader::new(jaq_core::defs()) |
| 536 | .load( |
| 537 | &arena, |
| 538 | File { |
| 539 | path: (), |
| 540 | code: program.as_str(), |
| 541 | }, |
| 542 | ) |
| 543 | .map_err(|e| Error::Invalid(format!("json secret: bad jq path `{field}`: {e:?}")))?; |
| 544 | |
| 545 | let funs = jaq_core::funs().chain(jaq_json::funs()); |
| 546 | let filter = Compiler::default() |
| 547 | .with_funs(funs) |
| 548 | .with_global_vars(["$__anvil_secret_value"]) |
| 549 | .compile(modules) |
| 550 | .map_err(|e| Error::Invalid(format!("json secret: bad jq path `{field}`: {e:?}")))?; |
| 551 | |
| 552 | let vars = Vars::new([Val::from(value.to_string())]); |
| 553 | let ctx = Ctx::<data::JustLut<Val>>::new(&filter.lut, vars); |
| 554 | let mut out = filter.id.run((ctx, current)).map(unwrap_valr); |
| 555 | let result = out |
| 556 | .next() |
| 557 | .ok_or_else(|| Error::Invalid("json secret: jq path produced no output".into()))? |
| 558 | .map_err(|e| Error::Invalid(format!("json secret: {e}")))?; |
| 559 | |
| 560 | let mut buf = Vec::new(); |
| 561 | let pp = jaq_json::write::Pp { |
| 562 | indent: Some(" ".to_string()), |
| 563 | ..Default::default() |
| 564 | }; |
| 565 | jaq_json::write::write(&mut buf, &pp, 0, &result) |
| 566 | .map_err(|e| Error::Invalid(format!("json secret: serializing result: {e}")))?; |
| 567 | Ok(buf) |
| 568 | } |
| 569 | |
| 570 | // --- persistence ----------------------------------------------------------- |
| 571 | |
| 572 | /// List a repository's secrets, oldest first. Envelopes are opaque here. |
| 573 | pub async fn list(db: &toasty::Db, repo_id: i64) -> Result<Vec<RepoSecret>> { |
| 574 | let mut conn = db.clone(); |
| 575 | let mut secrets = RepoSecret::filter(RepoSecret::fields().repo_id().eq(repo_id)) |
| 576 | .exec(&mut conn) |
| 577 | .await?; |
| 578 | secrets.sort_by(|a, b| a.name.cmp(&b.name)); |
| 579 | Ok(secrets) |
| 580 | } |
| 581 | |
| 582 | /// Look one up by name within a repository. |
| 583 | pub async fn find(db: &toasty::Db, repo_id: i64, name: &str) -> Result<Option<RepoSecret>> { |
| 584 | Ok(list(db, repo_id) |
| 585 | .await? |
| 586 | .into_iter() |
| 587 | .find(|s| s.name == name)) |
| 588 | } |
| 589 | |
| 590 | /// Create or replace a secret. `envelope` must already have been parsed with |
| 591 | /// [`Envelope::parse`]; its recipient fingerprints are denormalized onto the |
| 592 | /// row so the UI can flag secrets that a newly added key cannot open. |
| 593 | pub async fn put(db: &toasty::Db, repo_id: i64, name: &str, envelope: &Envelope) -> Result<()> { |
| 594 | if !valid_name(name) { |
| 595 | return Err(Error::Invalid( |
| 596 | "secret names are A–Z, 0–9 and _, and cannot start with a digit".into(), |
| 597 | )); |
| 598 | } |
| 599 | let json = serde_json::to_string(envelope) |
| 600 | .map_err(|e| Error::Invalid(format!("serializing envelope: {e}")))?; |
| 601 | let recipients = envelope.recipient_fingerprints().join(","); |
| 602 | let now = crate::now(); |
| 603 | let mut conn = db.clone(); |
| 604 | match find(db, repo_id, name).await? { |
| 605 | Some(mut existing) => { |
| 606 | existing |
| 607 | .update() |
| 608 | .envelope(json) |
| 609 | .recipients(recipients) |
| 610 | .updated_at(now) |
| 611 | .exec(&mut conn) |
| 612 | .await?; |
| 613 | } |
| 614 | None => { |
| 615 | toasty::create!(RepoSecret { |
| 616 | repo_id: repo_id, |
| 617 | name: name, |
| 618 | envelope: json, |
| 619 | recipients: recipients, |
| 620 | created_at: now, |
| 621 | updated_at: now, |
| 622 | }) |
| 623 | .exec(&mut conn) |
| 624 | .await?; |
| 625 | } |
| 626 | } |
| 627 | Ok(()) |
| 628 | } |
| 629 | |
| 630 | /// Delete a secret by name. No-op if it does not exist. |
| 631 | pub async fn delete(db: &toasty::Db, repo_id: i64, name: &str) -> Result<()> { |
| 632 | if let Some(secret) = find(db, repo_id, name).await? { |
| 633 | let mut conn = db.clone(); |
| 634 | secret.delete().exec(&mut conn).await?; |
| 635 | } |
| 636 | Ok(()) |
| 637 | } |
| 638 | |
| 639 | /// Delete every secret of a repository (used when the repo goes away). |
| 640 | pub async fn delete_all(db: &toasty::Db, repo_id: i64) -> Result<()> { |
| 641 | for secret in list(db, repo_id).await? { |
| 642 | let mut conn = db.clone(); |
| 643 | secret.delete().exec(&mut conn).await?; |
| 644 | } |
| 645 | Ok(()) |
| 646 | } |
| 647 | |
| 648 | // --- user secrets ------------------------------------------------------------ |
| 649 | // |
| 650 | // The same shape as the repository functions above, keyed by `user_id` |
| 651 | // instead of `repo_id`. See [`UserSecret`]. |
| 652 | |
| 653 | /// List an account's secrets, oldest first. Envelopes are opaque here. |
| 654 | pub async fn list_for_user(db: &toasty::Db, user_id: i64) -> Result<Vec<UserSecret>> { |
| 655 | let mut conn = db.clone(); |
| 656 | let mut secrets = UserSecret::filter(UserSecret::fields().user_id().eq(user_id)) |
| 657 | .exec(&mut conn) |
| 658 | .await?; |
| 659 | secrets.sort_by(|a, b| a.name.cmp(&b.name)); |
| 660 | Ok(secrets) |
| 661 | } |
| 662 | |
| 663 | /// Look one up by name within an account. |
| 664 | pub async fn find_for_user( |
| 665 | db: &toasty::Db, |
| 666 | user_id: i64, |
| 667 | name: &str, |
| 668 | ) -> Result<Option<UserSecret>> { |
| 669 | Ok(list_for_user(db, user_id) |
| 670 | .await? |
| 671 | .into_iter() |
| 672 | .find(|s| s.name == name)) |
| 673 | } |
| 674 | |
| 675 | /// Create or replace a user secret. `envelope` must already have been parsed |
| 676 | /// with [`Envelope::parse`]. `dest_path` must be non-empty for `kind::FILE`/ |
| 677 | /// `kind::JSON` and empty for `kind::ENV`; `field` must be non-empty only for |
| 678 | /// `kind::JSON`. |
| 679 | #[allow(clippy::too_many_arguments)] |
| 680 | pub async fn put_for_user( |
| 681 | db: &toasty::Db, |
| 682 | user_id: i64, |
| 683 | name: &str, |
| 684 | put_kind: &str, |
| 685 | dest_path: &str, |
| 686 | field: &str, |
| 687 | envelope: &Envelope, |
| 688 | ) -> Result<()> { |
| 689 | if !valid_name(name) { |
| 690 | return Err(Error::Invalid( |
| 691 | "secret names are A–Z, 0–9 and _, and cannot start with a digit".into(), |
| 692 | )); |
| 693 | } |
| 694 | // Always relative to $HOME by construction — strip a leading "~/" or "/" |
| 695 | // so "~/.claude/x.json", "/.claude/x.json" and ".claude/x.json" all store |
| 696 | // (and later inject) the same way. |
| 697 | let dest_path = dest_path |
| 698 | .strip_prefix("~/") |
| 699 | .or_else(|| dest_path.strip_prefix('/')) |
| 700 | .unwrap_or(dest_path); |
| 701 | let has_path = !dest_path.is_empty(); |
| 702 | let has_field = !field.is_empty(); |
| 703 | match put_kind { |
| 704 | kind::ENV if has_path || has_field => { |
| 705 | return Err(Error::Invalid("env secrets take no path or field".into())); |
| 706 | } |
| 707 | kind::FILE if !has_path || has_field => { |
| 708 | return Err(Error::Invalid( |
| 709 | "file secrets need a path and take no field".into(), |
| 710 | )); |
| 711 | } |
| 712 | kind::JSON if !has_path || !has_field => { |
| 713 | return Err(Error::Invalid( |
| 714 | "json secrets need both a path and a field".into(), |
| 715 | )); |
| 716 | } |
| 717 | kind::ENV | kind::FILE | kind::JSON => {} |
| 718 | _ => return Err(Error::Invalid(format!("unknown secret kind `{put_kind}`"))), |
| 719 | } |
| 720 | |
| 721 | let json = serde_json::to_string(envelope) |
| 722 | .map_err(|e| Error::Invalid(format!("serializing envelope: {e}")))?; |
| 723 | let recipients = envelope.recipient_fingerprints().join(","); |
| 724 | let now = crate::now(); |
| 725 | let mut conn = db.clone(); |
| 726 | match find_for_user(db, user_id, name).await? { |
| 727 | Some(mut existing) => { |
| 728 | existing |
| 729 | .update() |
| 730 | .kind(put_kind) |
| 731 | .dest_path(dest_path) |
| 732 | .field(field) |
| 733 | .envelope(json) |
| 734 | .recipients(recipients) |
| 735 | .updated_at(now) |
| 736 | .exec(&mut conn) |
| 737 | .await?; |
| 738 | } |
| 739 | None => { |
| 740 | toasty::create!(UserSecret { |
| 741 | user_id: user_id, |
| 742 | name: name, |
| 743 | kind: put_kind, |
| 744 | dest_path: dest_path, |
| 745 | field: field, |
| 746 | envelope: json, |
| 747 | recipients: recipients, |
| 748 | created_at: now, |
| 749 | updated_at: now, |
| 750 | }) |
| 751 | .exec(&mut conn) |
| 752 | .await?; |
| 753 | } |
| 754 | } |
| 755 | Ok(()) |
| 756 | } |
| 757 | |
| 758 | /// Delete a user secret by name. No-op if it does not exist. |
| 759 | pub async fn delete_for_user(db: &toasty::Db, user_id: i64, name: &str) -> Result<()> { |
| 760 | if let Some(secret) = find_for_user(db, user_id, name).await? { |
| 761 | let mut conn = db.clone(); |
| 762 | secret.delete().exec(&mut conn).await?; |
| 763 | } |
| 764 | Ok(()) |
| 765 | } |
| 766 | |
| 767 | /// Delete every secret of an account (for account deletion, once that path |
| 768 | /// exists — mirrors [`delete_all`]). |
| 769 | pub async fn delete_all_for_user(db: &toasty::Db, user_id: i64) -> Result<()> { |
| 770 | for secret in list_for_user(db, user_id).await? { |
| 771 | let mut conn = db.clone(); |
| 772 | secret.delete().exec(&mut conn).await?; |
| 773 | } |
| 774 | Ok(()) |
| 775 | } |
| 776 | |
| 777 | // --- the unlock vault ------------------------------------------------------ |
| 778 | |
| 779 | /// Plaintext secrets for unlocked repositories, held in memory only. |
| 780 | /// |
| 781 | /// A repository is *sealed* until someone with a recipient ssh key runs |
| 782 | /// `anvild secret unlock`, which opens the envelopes locally and posts the |
| 783 | /// values here. They live in this map and nowhere else: no file, no database |
| 784 | /// row, no log. A restart re-seals every repository, and each entry expires on |
| 785 | /// its own TTL. CI reads from here (see `anvil-ci`), which is the one place |
| 786 | /// anvil handles plaintext at all. |
| 787 | #[derive(Clone, Default)] |
| 788 | pub struct Vault { |
| 789 | inner: std::sync::Arc<std::sync::Mutex<std::collections::HashMap<i64, Unlocked>>>, |
| 790 | } |
| 791 | |
| 792 | struct Unlocked { |
| 793 | values: std::collections::BTreeMap<String, String>, |
| 794 | expires_at: i64, |
| 795 | } |
| 796 | |
| 797 | impl Drop for Unlocked { |
| 798 | /// Overwrite the plaintext when an entry expires or is replaced, so it |
| 799 | /// does not linger in freed heap pages. |
| 800 | fn drop(&mut self) { |
| 801 | for value in self.values.values_mut() { |
| 802 | // SAFETY-adjacent: writing over the bytes in place. `String`'s |
| 803 | // buffer is the only copy we made. |
| 804 | unsafe { value.as_bytes_mut() }.fill(0); |
| 805 | } |
| 806 | } |
| 807 | } |
| 808 | |
| 809 | /// What the UI shows about an unlocked repository. |
| 810 | #[derive(Clone, Copy, Debug)] |
| 811 | pub struct UnlockStatus { |
| 812 | pub expires_at: i64, |
| 813 | pub count: usize, |
| 814 | } |
| 815 | |
| 816 | /// Current Unix time in seconds, so the web layer can render an unlock |
| 817 | /// countdown against the same clock the vault expires on. |
| 818 | pub fn now_secs() -> i64 { |
| 819 | crate::now() |
| 820 | } |
| 821 | |
| 822 | /// Longest an unlock may last before it has to be renewed. |
| 823 | pub const MAX_UNLOCK_SECS: i64 = 7 * 24 * 60 * 60; |
| 824 | |
| 825 | impl Vault { |
| 826 | /// Store `values` for `repo_id`, replacing any previous unlock. Returns |
| 827 | /// the expiry timestamp. |
| 828 | pub fn unlock( |
| 829 | &self, |
| 830 | repo_id: i64, |
| 831 | values: std::collections::BTreeMap<String, String>, |
| 832 | ttl_secs: i64, |
| 833 | ) -> i64 { |
| 834 | let ttl = ttl_secs.clamp(60, MAX_UNLOCK_SECS); |
| 835 | let expires_at = crate::now() + ttl; |
| 836 | let mut map = self.inner.lock().expect("vault mutex"); |
| 837 | map.insert(repo_id, Unlocked { values, expires_at }); |
| 838 | expires_at |
| 839 | } |
| 840 | |
| 841 | /// Forget a repository's secrets immediately. |
| 842 | pub fn lock(&self, repo_id: i64) { |
| 843 | self.inner.lock().expect("vault mutex").remove(&repo_id); |
| 844 | } |
| 845 | |
| 846 | /// Current unlock state, or `None` if sealed or expired. |
| 847 | pub fn status(&self, repo_id: i64) -> Option<UnlockStatus> { |
| 848 | let mut map = self.inner.lock().expect("vault mutex"); |
| 849 | let entry = map.get(&repo_id)?; |
| 850 | if entry.expires_at <= crate::now() { |
| 851 | map.remove(&repo_id); |
| 852 | return None; |
| 853 | } |
| 854 | Some(UnlockStatus { |
| 855 | expires_at: entry.expires_at, |
| 856 | count: entry.values.len(), |
| 857 | }) |
| 858 | } |
| 859 | |
| 860 | /// Fetch the named secrets for a CI run. Returns the names that are not |
| 861 | /// available as the error, so the runner can say exactly what is missing. |
| 862 | /// |
| 863 | /// Asking for nothing always succeeds, sealed repository or not — the |
| 864 | /// overwhelmingly common pipeline declares no `secrets:` at all, and |
| 865 | /// failing it here would mean no repository could run CI until someone had |
| 866 | /// unlocked it for secrets it does not use. |
| 867 | pub fn take( |
| 868 | &self, |
| 869 | repo_id: i64, |
| 870 | names: &[String], |
| 871 | ) -> std::result::Result<Vec<(String, String)>, Vec<String>> { |
| 872 | if names.is_empty() { |
| 873 | return Ok(Vec::new()); |
| 874 | } |
| 875 | let mut map = self.inner.lock().expect("vault mutex"); |
| 876 | let Some(entry) = map.get(&repo_id) else { |
| 877 | return Err(names.to_vec()); |
| 878 | }; |
| 879 | if entry.expires_at <= crate::now() { |
| 880 | map.remove(&repo_id); |
| 881 | return Err(names.to_vec()); |
| 882 | } |
| 883 | let mut found = Vec::with_capacity(names.len()); |
| 884 | let mut missing = Vec::new(); |
| 885 | for name in names { |
| 886 | match entry.values.get(name) { |
| 887 | Some(value) => found.push((name.clone(), value.clone())), |
| 888 | None => missing.push(name.clone()), |
| 889 | } |
| 890 | } |
| 891 | if missing.is_empty() { |
| 892 | Ok(found) |
| 893 | } else { |
| 894 | Err(missing) |
| 895 | } |
| 896 | } |
| 897 | |
| 898 | /// Drop expired entries (called from the periodic sweep). |
| 899 | pub fn sweep(&self) { |
| 900 | let now = crate::now(); |
| 901 | self.inner |
| 902 | .lock() |
| 903 | .expect("vault mutex") |
| 904 | .retain(|_, entry| entry.expires_at > now); |
| 905 | } |
| 906 | } |
| 907 | |
| 908 | #[cfg(test)] |
| 909 | mod tests { |
| 910 | use ssh_key::{ |
| 911 | PrivateKey, |
| 912 | private::Ed25519Keypair, |
| 913 | }; |
| 914 | |
| 915 | use super::*; |
| 916 | |
| 917 | #[test] |
| 918 | fn json_merge_sets_a_top_level_field_on_empty_input() { |
| 919 | let out = json_merge(b"", ".token", "hunter2").unwrap(); |
| 920 | let v: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_slice(&out).unwrap(); |
| 921 | assert_eq!(v, serde_json::json!({"token": "hunter2"})); |
| 922 | } |
| 923 | |
| 924 | #[test] |
| 925 | fn json_merge_creates_intermediate_objects() { |
| 926 | let out = json_merge(b"", ".oauthAccount.token", "hunter2").unwrap(); |
| 927 | let v: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_slice(&out).unwrap(); |
| 928 | assert_eq!(v, serde_json::json!({"oauthAccount": {"token": "hunter2"}})); |
| 929 | } |
| 930 | |
| 931 | #[test] |
| 932 | fn json_merge_preserves_sibling_fields() { |
| 933 | let existing = br#"{"theme":"auto","oauthAccount":{"other":1}}"#; |
| 934 | let out = json_merge(existing, ".oauthAccount.token", "hunter2").unwrap(); |
| 935 | let v: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_slice(&out).unwrap(); |
| 936 | assert_eq!( |
| 937 | v, |
| 938 | serde_json::json!({"theme": "auto", "oauthAccount": {"other": 1, "token": "hunter2"}}) |
| 939 | ); |
| 940 | } |
| 941 | |
| 942 | #[test] |
| 943 | fn json_merge_does_not_interpolate_the_value_as_jq_syntax() { |
| 944 | // A value that looks like a jq injection attempt must land as a |
| 945 | // literal string, not be evaluated. |
| 946 | let out = json_merge(b"", ".token", "\" | .pwned = true # ").unwrap(); |
| 947 | let v: serde_json::Value = serde_json::from_slice(&out).unwrap(); |
| 948 | assert_eq!(v, serde_json::json!({"token": "\" | .pwned = true # "})); |
| 949 | } |
| 950 | |
| 951 | #[test] |
| 952 | fn json_merge_rejects_bad_paths() { |
| 953 | assert!(json_merge(b"{}", "not a jq path", "x").is_err()); |
| 954 | } |
| 955 | |
| 956 | fn keypair() -> (PrivateKey, Recipient) { |
| 957 | let key = PrivateKey::from(Ed25519Keypair::from_seed(&random_bytes())); |
| 958 | let line = key.public_key().to_openssh().unwrap(); |
| 959 | let recipient = Recipient::from_openssh(&line).unwrap(); |
| 960 | (key, recipient) |
| 961 | } |
| 962 | |
| 963 | #[test] |
| 964 | fn seals_and_opens_for_every_recipient() { |
| 965 | let (a_key, a) = keypair(); |
| 966 | let (b_key, b) = keypair(); |
| 967 | let aad = body_aad("collin", "anvil", "DEPLOY_TOKEN"); |
| 968 | |
| 969 | let env = seal(b"hunter2", &aad, &[a.clone(), b.clone()]).unwrap(); |
| 970 | for key in [&a_key, &b_key] { |
| 971 | let id = Identity::from_private_key(key).unwrap(); |
| 972 | assert_eq!(env.open(&aad, &id).unwrap(), b"hunter2"); |
| 973 | } |
| 974 | } |
| 975 | |
| 976 | #[test] |
| 977 | fn a_key_that_is_not_a_recipient_cannot_open() { |
| 978 | let (_, a) = keypair(); |
| 979 | let (outsider_key, _) = keypair(); |
| 980 | let aad = body_aad("collin", "anvil", "TOKEN"); |
| 981 | let env = seal(b"hunter2", &aad, &[a]).unwrap(); |
| 982 | let outsider = Identity::from_private_key(&outsider_key).unwrap(); |
| 983 | assert!(env.open(&aad, &outsider).is_err()); |
| 984 | } |
| 985 | |
| 986 | #[test] |
| 987 | fn associated_data_binds_the_name_and_repo() { |
| 988 | let (key, r) = keypair(); |
| 989 | let id = Identity::from_private_key(&key).unwrap(); |
| 990 | let env = seal(b"hunter2", &body_aad("collin", "anvil", "TOKEN"), &[r]).unwrap(); |
| 991 | assert!( |
| 992 | env.open(&body_aad("collin", "anvil", "OTHER"), &id) |
| 993 | .is_err() |
| 994 | ); |
| 995 | assert!( |
| 996 | env.open(&body_aad("mallory", "anvil", "TOKEN"), &id) |
| 997 | .is_err() |
| 998 | ); |
| 999 | } |
| 1000 | |
| 1001 | #[test] |
| 1002 | fn user_aad_round_trips_and_never_opens_under_a_repo_aad() { |
| 1003 | let (key, r) = keypair(); |
| 1004 | let id = Identity::from_private_key(&key).unwrap(); |
| 1005 | let env = seal( |
| 1006 | b"hunter2", |
| 1007 | &user_aad("collin", "TOKEN"), |
| 1008 | std::slice::from_ref(&r), |
| 1009 | ) |
| 1010 | .unwrap(); |
| 1011 | assert_eq!( |
| 1012 | env.open(&user_aad("collin", "TOKEN"), &id).unwrap(), |
| 1013 | b"hunter2" |
| 1014 | ); |
| 1015 | // No repo name can ever collide with "user:{username}": the AAD |
| 1016 | // schemes are namespace-disjoint by construction. |
| 1017 | assert!( |
| 1018 | env.open(&body_aad("collin", "TOKEN", "TOKEN"), &id) |
| 1019 | .is_err() |
| 1020 | ); |
| 1021 | |
| 1022 | // And the reverse: a repo secret cannot be opened as a user secret. |
| 1023 | let repo_env = seal(b"hunter2", &body_aad("collin", "anvil", "TOKEN"), &[r]).unwrap(); |
| 1024 | assert!(repo_env.open(&user_aad("collin", "TOKEN"), &id).is_err()); |
| 1025 | } |
| 1026 | |
| 1027 | #[test] |
| 1028 | fn vault_take_is_a_per_call_allowlist() { |
| 1029 | let vault = Vault::default(); |
| 1030 | let mut values = std::collections::BTreeMap::new(); |
| 1031 | values.insert("A".to_string(), "1".to_string()); |
| 1032 | values.insert("B".to_string(), "2".to_string()); |
| 1033 | vault.unlock(1, values, 3600); |
| 1034 | |
| 1035 | // Asking for a subset returns exactly that subset. |
| 1036 | let got = vault.take(1, &["A".to_string()]).unwrap(); |
| 1037 | assert_eq!(got, vec![("A".to_string(), "1".to_string())]); |
| 1038 | |
| 1039 | // Asking for a name that was never unlocked reports it missing, |
| 1040 | // even though other names for the same key are available. |
| 1041 | let missing = vault |
| 1042 | .take(1, &["A".to_string(), "C".to_string()]) |
| 1043 | .unwrap_err(); |
| 1044 | assert_eq!(missing, vec!["C".to_string()]); |
| 1045 | |
| 1046 | // A key with nothing unlocked reports every requested name missing. |
| 1047 | let missing = vault.take(2, &["A".to_string()]).unwrap_err(); |
| 1048 | assert_eq!(missing, vec!["A".to_string()]); |
| 1049 | |
| 1050 | // But a pipeline that declares no secrets is satisfiable by a sealed |
| 1051 | // repository, which is the case nearly every pipeline is in: CI must |
| 1052 | // not require an unlock for secrets it never asked for. |
| 1053 | assert!(vault.take(2, &[]).unwrap().is_empty()); |
| 1054 | } |
| 1055 | |
| 1056 | #[test] |
| 1057 | fn tampering_with_the_body_is_detected() { |
| 1058 | let (key, r) = keypair(); |
| 1059 | let id = Identity::from_private_key(&key).unwrap(); |
| 1060 | let aad = body_aad("collin", "anvil", "TOKEN"); |
| 1061 | let mut env = seal(b"hunter2", &aad, &[r]).unwrap(); |
| 1062 | let mut ct = b64().decode(&env.ct).unwrap(); |
| 1063 | ct[0] ^= 1; |
| 1064 | env.ct = b64().encode(ct); |
| 1065 | assert!(env.open(&aad, &id).is_err()); |
| 1066 | } |
| 1067 | |
| 1068 | #[test] |
| 1069 | fn envelopes_round_trip_through_json() { |
| 1070 | let (key, r) = keypair(); |
| 1071 | let id = Identity::from_private_key(&key).unwrap(); |
| 1072 | let aad = body_aad("collin", "anvil", "TOKEN"); |
| 1073 | let json = serde_json::to_string(&seal(b"hunter2", &aad, &[r]).unwrap()).unwrap(); |
| 1074 | let parsed = Envelope::parse(&json).unwrap(); |
| 1075 | assert_eq!(parsed.open(&aad, &id).unwrap(), b"hunter2"); |
| 1076 | } |
| 1077 | |
| 1078 | #[test] |
| 1079 | fn rejects_malformed_envelopes() { |
| 1080 | assert!(Envelope::parse("{}").is_err()); |
| 1081 | assert!( |
| 1082 | Envelope::parse(r#"{"v":2,"alg":"x","recipients":[],"nonce":"","ct":""}"#).is_err() |
| 1083 | ); |
| 1084 | } |
| 1085 | |
| 1086 | #[test] |
| 1087 | fn validates_names() { |
| 1088 | assert!(valid_name("DEPLOY_TOKEN")); |
| 1089 | assert!(valid_name("TOKEN2")); |
| 1090 | assert!(!valid_name("2TOKEN")); |
| 1091 | assert!(!valid_name("deploy_token")); |
| 1092 | assert!(!valid_name("DEPLOY-TOKEN")); |
| 1093 | assert!(!valid_name("")); |
| 1094 | } |
| 1095 | } |