All six remaining TODO items — see the checked-off entries at the top of this file for the details. Headlines:

• CI artifacts (docs/ci-artifacts.md is the canonical reference): artifacts: in .anvil/ci.yml; broker pulls them out of the stopped container via download_from_container (inverse of the checkout upload — still no mounts); meta extractors run inside the sandbox, one file per value under /tmp/anvil-meta; browse: true directories are served like pages (rustdoc-ready); /{owner}/{repo}/artifacts/{rev}/{name} is the latest-on-branch alias; per-repo quota GC pins branch tips. New table ci_artifacts + [ci] artifact_*_mb caps.
• Schema shims for existing DBs (anvil-core/src/db.rs): Toasty still only pushes schema on a fresh file, so new tables/columns ship as idempotent DDL applied on connect (SCHEMA_SHIMS/COLUMN_SHIMS), with tests asserting fresh and migrated databases converge. New deps: rusqlite (pinned to toasty's), flate2.
• Issues (anvil-core/src/issues.rs, anvil-web/src/issues.rs): minimal GitHub-shaped tracker; tables issues + issue_comments.
• Push mirroring (anvil-git/src/mirror.rs): repositories.mirror_url → background git push --mirror after each push; Dockerfile now installs git (the one thing gix can't do yet is push).
• Push-to-create (repos::create_on_push + both transports), README on repo page, SSH-first clone pills, rev-switcher/browse-at-rev UI (committed earlier this session, along with the anvil-cli rename).

• UI quick wins (crates/anvil-web/src/ui.rs) — latest-commit bar on the repo page (sha + subject + author/time, attached above the file box, links to the commit); profile page no longer shows the email; repo header reads owner / repo without the leading anvil /.
• (c) sandboxed CI broker — job containers now run with cap_drop=ALL + no-new-privileges unconditionally, plus config-driven pids_limit (512), memory_mb+swap (2048), cpus (2), wall-clock timeout_secs (1800, force-removed on expiry), optional network = false, run_as, and an allowed_images allowlist (empty = any; tagless entry allows all tags). CiConfig in crates/anvil-core/src/config.rs (with image_allowed test); execute() in crates/anvil-ci/src/lib.rs. Read-only rootfs deliberately skipped (workspace lives in the container fs; no volumes ever attached). Docs: DEPLOY.md §7, anvil.example.toml [ci].
• (b) threat model — docs/untrusted-mode.md: severity-ranked analysis (CI containment, pages/stored-XSS origin, git resource exhaustion, registration anti-abuse, authz granularity, webhook SSRF), the already-right list, and the stance: single-tenant supported, untrusted gated on items 1–4.
• Pages hosting — crates/anvil-web/src/pages.rs: serves a repo's pages branch at /{owner}/{repo}/pages/...; top-level dirs are separate sites (rustdoc, book, …); index.html resolution with trailing-slash redirect so relative links work; extension→content-type map + nosniff; listing page with publish hint; "Pages" button on the repo header. Visibility follows the repo (private → 404). Publish with git push origin <built-branch>:pages.

• CI UI — runs list /{owner}/{repo}/ci, run-detail (status/timing/log), per-commit status badges, "CI" nav link. (crates/anvil-web/src/ui.rs)
• CD redeploy webhook — on a green run of [ci] deploy_branch in the single [ci] deploy_repo, POST to [ci] deploy_webhook (X-Anvil-Deploy-Secret header). Scoped to ONE repo. CiConfig in crates/anvil-core/src/config.rs; deploy() in crates/anvil-ci/src/lib.rs. Docs: DEPLOY.md §7, deploy/anvil.toml. reqwest added with NO TLS feature (keeps musl cross-compile aws-lc-free).
• Docker socket on hagrid — deploy/run.sh mounts it + --group-adds the gid for the non-root user; caveat in DEPLOY.md §4.
• Toasty ORM cleanup — ci.rs list_by_repo/latest_for_commit/ queued_ids now sort/limit/filter in SQL, not in memory. Verified by the new ordering_and_limit_run_in_the_database test. (Sweep: these were the only real instances; repos::list_all_with_owner sorts by a joined username and needs all rows — intentionally left.)
• (a) CSRF + cookie hardening —
  • Cookie: HttpOnly + SameSite=Lax + Secure (auto via Config::secure_cookies() when base_url is https).
  • Synchronizer token HMAC-SHA256(server_secret, session); secret persisted at data_dir/csrf_secret (App::csrf_token in crates/anvil-core/src/lib.rs). Deps hmac, sha2.
  • Csrf extractor + constant-time verify_csrf (crates/anvil-web/src/auth.rs). Hidden csrf field + verification on add/delete SSH key, new repo, repo settings. Login exempt; logout relies on SameSite.
  • htmx insurance: auth::csrf_context middleware → request-scoped task-local; layout sends the token via hx-headers on every htmx request.

(a) CSRF + cookie hardening, (b) docs/untrusted-mode.md threat model, (c) sandboxed CI broker. Stronger isolation tiers (gVisor/Kata/Firecracker, egress filtering, CI-minute quotas) are recorded in the threat model as the gate for untrusted tenants, not planned work.

• CSRF header consumption: hx-headers sends the token as a csrf header, but verify_csrf only reads the form field. When we add a tokenless htmx action (raw hx-post/hx-delete, no <form>), also read the csrf header.
• Toasty migrations: still no real migration system; the shim approach in db::connect (SCHEMA_SHIMS for tables, COLUMN_SHIMS for columns, both test-verified against a fresh push_schema) covers what we've needed so far. New columns must be declared last in the model.
• Mirror URL secrecy: repositories.mirror_url may embed a token and is stored plaintext in SQLite (logged redacted). Fine single-tenant; revisit if the DB ever leaves the box.
• Pages caveats (single-tenant-acceptable): served from the forge origin — move to a separate origin before untrusted users (threat model §2); whole blobs load into memory per request (fine at our scale). The same applies to browse: true CI artifacts.
• Issue tracker minimalism: no labels, assignees, milestones, or editing/deleting of posts. Per-repo numbering assumes a single server process (matches deployment; noted in models.rs).

9. Pull requests (gix merge) · 10. Webhooks (mind the SSRF item). (8. Issues shipped 2026-06-10.)