collin/anvil
1f463de586fbfeb46c9a7f1d5a63230df5b3f3a7 / TODO.md
| 1 | # Misc TODO |
| 2 | |
| 3 | - [x] do we have a way to view the source in a repo by branch or at a given commit? |
| 4 | - yes: `/{owner}/{repo}/tree/{rev}` always accepted any branch/tag/commit; |
| 5 | what was missing was UI. Added: branch/tag switcher dropdown on the repo |
| 6 | and tree pages, "browse files" link on the commit page, percent-encoded |
| 7 | ref names so branches with `/` work, and an unborn-HEAD fallback so a |
| 8 | repo whose HEAD names a missing branch no longer renders as empty. |
| 9 | - [ ] implement the CI artifact system _(designed — see `docs/ci-artifacts.md`; |
| 10 | implementation order is at the bottom of that doc)_ |
| 11 | - every push triggers CI on the tip commit (already true); a run should be |
| 12 | able to produce artifacts |
| 13 | - artifacts are stored per-commit and served from anvil (download from the |
| 14 | run page / commit page; latest-on-branch alias would be nice) |
| 15 | - jobs can declare how to extract metadata from artifacts (e.g. sizes, |
| 16 | test/coverage numbers, version strings) so it can be surfaced in the UI |
| 17 | next to the run/commit |
| 18 | - sketch needed: where artifacts live on disk, retention/GC, how |
| 19 | `.anvil/ci.yml` declares artifact paths + metadata extractors, and how |
| 20 | the broker gets files out of the sandboxed container |
| 21 | - use rustdoc as an example when testing the feature: it generates a big |
| 22 | HTML subtree, so support rendering/serving a whole HTML artifact subtree |
| 23 | the way the pages feature does (rustdoc output as a served site) |
| 24 | - [ ] repo mirroring to/from GitHub |
| 25 | - push mirror: pushes to an anvil repo get forwarded to a configured |
| 26 | GitHub remote |
| 27 | - pull mirror (maybe): a repo that virtually mirrors a GitHub repo and |
| 28 | just displays it here — periodically fetched, read-only on the anvil |
| 29 | side |
| 30 | - [ ] per-repository issue tracker |
| 31 | - [x] rename the `anvil` crate to `anvil_cli` _(named it `anvil-cli` to match |
| 32 | the workspace's hyphenated crate names; the binary is still `anvild`, so |
| 33 | deploy scripts and docs needed no changes)_ |
| 34 | |
| 35 | --- |
| 36 | |
| 37 | # Error in git push _(FIXED 2026-06-10, uncommitted)_ |
| 38 | |
| 39 | **Root cause:** every push after the first sends a *thin pack* — deltas whose |
| 40 | base objects aren't in the pack (the server already has them), referenced by |
| 41 | object id (`REF_DELTA`). `vendor/gitserver-core/src/receive_pack.rs::write_pack` |
| 42 | passed `None` as `thin_pack_base_object_lookup` to |
| 43 | `gix_pack::Bundle::write_to_directory`, so gix couldn't resolve the bases and |
| 44 | aborted. First-push-to-empty-repo worked because that pack is self-contained. |
| 45 | |
| 46 | **Fix:** pass the already-open `gix::Repository` as the lookup (it implements |
| 47 | `gix_object::Find`). Regression test |
| 48 | `receive_thin_pack_with_ref_deltas` builds a real thin pack via |
| 49 | `git pack-objects --thin`, asserts it contains ref-deltas, and pushes it |
| 50 | through `receive_pack`. Verified the test fails without the fix. |
| 51 | |
| 52 | Original report: |
| 53 | |
| 54 | ``` |
| 55 | collin@mini ~/C/anvil (main)> git push |
| 56 | Enter passphrase for key '/Users/collin/.ssh/id_ed25519': |
| 57 | Enumerating objects: 117, done. |
| 58 | Counting objects: 100% (117/117), done. |
| 59 | Delta compression using up to 8 threads |
| 60 | Compressing objects: 100% (62/62), done. |
| 61 | Writing objects: 100% (66/66), 27.57 KiB | 3.94 MiB/s, done. |
| 62 | Total 66 (delta 39), reused 0 (delta 0), pack-reused 0 (from 0) |
| 63 | send-pack: unexpected disconnect while reading sideband packet |
| 64 | fatal: the remote end hung up unexpectedly |
| 65 | collin@mini ~/C/anvil (main) [128]> |
| 66 | ``` |
| 67 | |
| 68 | server logs: |
| 69 | |
| 70 | ``` |
| 71 | 26-06-09T21:53:46.466577Z INFO anvil_ssh: ssh auth: accepted key SHA256:Rg41caN7vw2WYYxiJN6lrIlX0DTXYF0rC2QzKZW1tB0 (user 1) |
| 72 | 2026-06-09T21:53:46.635946Z INFO anvil_ssh: ssh git-receive-pack on collin/anvil.git (user Some(1)) |
| 73 | 2026-06-09T21:53:46.805146Z ERROR anvil_ssh: git ssh git-receive-pack: protocol error: failed to write incoming pack: Ref delta objects are not supported as there is no way to look them up. Resolve them beforehand. |
| 74 | 2026-06-09T21:54:28.571834Z INFO anvil_ssh: ssh auth: rejected unknown key SHA256:ZlWZyHqspqFeUQV84qaXtDQq4gcA33dR7y8dYbeg9u8 |
| 75 | 2026-06-09T21:54:35.565597Z INFO anvil_ssh: ssh auth: accepted key SHA256:Rg41caN7vw2WYYxiJN6lrIlX0DTXYF0rC2QzKZW1tB0 (user 1) |
| 76 | 2026-06-09T21:54:35.676113Z INFO anvil_ssh: ssh git-receive-pack on collin/anvil.git (user Some(1)) |
| 77 | 2026-06-09T21:54:36.268520Z ERROR anvil_ssh: git ssh git-receive-pack: protocol error: failed to write incoming pack: Ref delta objects are not supported as there is no way to look them up. Resolve them beforehand. |
| 78 | 2026-06-09T21:55:54.223033Z INFO anvil_ssh: ssh auth: rejected unknown key SHA256:ZlWZyHqspqFeUQV84qaXtDQq4gcA33dR7y8dYbeg9u8 |
| 79 | 2026-06-09T21:56:00.758384Z INFO anvil_ssh: ssh auth: accepted key SHA256:Rg41caN7vw2WYYxiJN6lrIlX0DTXYF0rC2QzKZW1tB0 (user 1) |
| 80 | 2026-06-09T21:56:00.906553Z INFO anvil_ssh: ssh git-receive-pack on collin/anvil.git (user Some(1)) |
| 81 | 2026-06-09T21:56:01.067903Z ERROR anvil_ssh: git ssh git-receive-pack: protocol error: failed to write incoming pack: Ref delta objects are not supported as there is no way to look them up. Resolve them beforehand. |
| 82 | ``` |
| 83 | |
| 84 | --- |
| 85 | |
| 86 | # Session notes / resume point |
| 87 | |
| 88 | _Last updated: 2026-06-10 (second session). Working state is clean: `cargo |
| 89 | build`, `cargo clippy --workspace`, `cargo fmt --all`, and `cargo test |
| 90 | --workspace` all pass. Everything below is UNCOMMITTED (repo convention: |
| 91 | commit only when asked). **All top-of-file TODO items are done.**_ |
| 92 | |
| 93 | ## Done this session (2026-06-10, second session) |
| 94 | |
| 95 | - **UI quick wins** (`crates/anvil-web/src/ui.rs`) — latest-commit bar on the |
| 96 | repo page (sha + subject + author/time, attached above the file box, links |
| 97 | to the commit); profile page no longer shows the email; repo header reads |
| 98 | `owner / repo` without the leading `anvil /`. |
| 99 | - **(c) sandboxed CI broker** — job containers now run with `cap_drop=ALL` + |
| 100 | `no-new-privileges` unconditionally, plus config-driven `pids_limit` (512), |
| 101 | `memory_mb`+swap (2048), `cpus` (2), wall-clock `timeout_secs` (1800, |
| 102 | force-removed on expiry), optional `network = false`, `run_as`, and an |
| 103 | `allowed_images` allowlist (empty = any; tagless entry allows all tags). |
| 104 | `CiConfig` in `crates/anvil-core/src/config.rs` (with `image_allowed` test); |
| 105 | `execute()` in `crates/anvil-ci/src/lib.rs`. Read-only rootfs deliberately |
| 106 | skipped (workspace lives in the container fs; no volumes ever attached). |
| 107 | Docs: `DEPLOY.md` §7, `anvil.example.toml` `[ci]`. |
| 108 | - **(b) threat model** — `docs/untrusted-mode.md`: severity-ranked analysis |
| 109 | (CI containment, pages/stored-XSS origin, git resource exhaustion, |
| 110 | registration anti-abuse, authz granularity, webhook SSRF), the already-right |
| 111 | list, and the stance: single-tenant supported, untrusted gated on items 1–4. |
| 112 | - **Pages hosting** — `crates/anvil-web/src/pages.rs`: serves a repo's `pages` |
| 113 | branch at `/{owner}/{repo}/pages/...`; top-level dirs are separate sites |
| 114 | (rustdoc, book, …); `index.html` resolution with trailing-slash redirect so |
| 115 | relative links work; extension→content-type map + `nosniff`; listing page |
| 116 | with publish hint; "Pages" button on the repo header. Visibility follows the |
| 117 | repo (private → 404). Publish with `git push origin <built-branch>:pages`. |
| 118 | |
| 119 | ## Done earlier (same day, first session) |
| 120 | |
| 121 | - **CI UI** — runs list `/{owner}/{repo}/ci`, run-detail (status/timing/log), |
| 122 | per-commit status badges, "CI" nav link. (`crates/anvil-web/src/ui.rs`) |
| 123 | - **CD redeploy webhook** — on a green run of `[ci] deploy_branch` in the single |
| 124 | `[ci] deploy_repo`, POST to `[ci] deploy_webhook` (`X-Anvil-Deploy-Secret` |
| 125 | header). Scoped to ONE repo. `CiConfig` in `crates/anvil-core/src/config.rs`; |
| 126 | `deploy()` in `crates/anvil-ci/src/lib.rs`. Docs: `DEPLOY.md` §7, |
| 127 | `deploy/anvil.toml`. `reqwest` added with NO TLS feature (keeps musl |
| 128 | cross-compile aws-lc-free). |
| 129 | - **Docker socket on hagrid** — `deploy/run.sh` mounts it + `--group-add`s the |
| 130 | gid for the non-root user; caveat in `DEPLOY.md` §4. |
| 131 | - **Toasty ORM cleanup** — `ci.rs` `list_by_repo`/`latest_for_commit`/ |
| 132 | `queued_ids` now sort/limit/filter in SQL, not in memory. Verified by the new |
| 133 | `ordering_and_limit_run_in_the_database` test. (Sweep: these were the only |
| 134 | real instances; `repos::list_all_with_owner` sorts by a joined username and |
| 135 | needs all rows — intentionally left.) |
| 136 | - **(a) CSRF + cookie hardening** — |
| 137 | - Cookie: `HttpOnly` + `SameSite=Lax` + `Secure` (auto via |
| 138 | `Config::secure_cookies()` when base_url is https). |
| 139 | - Synchronizer token `HMAC-SHA256(server_secret, session)`; secret persisted |
| 140 | at `data_dir/csrf_secret` (`App::csrf_token` in `crates/anvil-core/src/lib.rs`). |
| 141 | Deps `hmac`, `sha2`. |
| 142 | - `Csrf` extractor + constant-time `verify_csrf` (`crates/anvil-web/src/auth.rs`). |
| 143 | Hidden `csrf` field + verification on add/delete SSH key, new repo, repo |
| 144 | settings. Login exempt; logout relies on SameSite. |
| 145 | - htmx insurance: `auth::csrf_context` middleware → request-scoped task-local; |
| 146 | `layout` sends the token via `hx-headers` on every htmx request. |
| 147 | |
| 148 | ## The a/b/c plan — ALL DONE |
| 149 | |
| 150 | (a) CSRF + cookie hardening, (b) `docs/untrusted-mode.md` threat model, |
| 151 | (c) sandboxed CI broker. Stronger isolation tiers (gVisor/Kata/Firecracker, |
| 152 | egress filtering, CI-minute quotas) are recorded in the threat model as the |
| 153 | gate for untrusted tenants, not planned work. |
| 154 | |
| 155 | ## Loose ends |
| 156 | |
| 157 | - **CSRF header consumption:** `hx-headers` sends the token as a `csrf` header, |
| 158 | but `verify_csrf` only reads the form field. When we add a tokenless htmx |
| 159 | action (raw `hx-post`/`hx-delete`, no `<form>`), also read the `csrf` header. |
| 160 | - **Toasty migrations:** schema only pushed on a fresh DB (`db::connect`); new |
| 161 | columns won't apply to an existing DB until migrations land. (The |
| 162 | `data_dir/csrf_secret` file is created automatically — no DB change.) |
| 163 | - **Suggested commits when ready:** (1) CI UI, (2) CD webhook + deploy wiring, |
| 164 | (3) ci.rs ORM cleanup + test, (4) CSRF + cookies, (5) UI quick wins |
| 165 | (latest-commit bar, profile email, breadcrumb), (6) CI sandbox + threat-model |
| 166 | doc, (7) pages hosting. Trailer: `Co-Authored-By: Claude ...`. |
| 167 | - **Pages caveats (single-tenant-acceptable):** served from the forge origin — |
| 168 | move to a separate origin before untrusted users (threat model §2); whole |
| 169 | blobs load into memory per request (fine at our scale). |
| 170 | |
| 171 | ## Remaining roadmap (plan milestones beyond a/b/c) |
| 172 | |
| 173 | 8. Issues · 9. Pull requests (gix merge) · 10. Webhooks (mind the SSRF item). |